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Abstract
Effective computer security requires looking not just at technology, but also at
how it meshes with users in the real-world enterprises depending on it. As part of
a longer-term series of projects, we have been looking at these issues— particularly
access control— in a variety of real-world enterprises. In previous work, we looked at
companies in the finance and software industries; this paper reports on a study of a
hospital’s access control systems. Both studies employ ethnographic methods to elicit
observations on the failures of current access control technologies in large, dynamic
organizations; participants in the corporate study were largely drawn from IT staff
members, whereas this clinical study involved a larger number of end users.
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Introduction

Computer systems exist to serve some larger human goal. Considering the effectiveness
of access control and other security techniques requires more than just examining computer technology; we also need to look at how the human users, in real-world workflow
in real-world enterprises, interact with this technology.
Previous researchers and practitioners have lamented the access control hygiene
problem that seems to emerge in many large enterprises: what happens in practice is
much less clean than what the textbooks say [2]. In earlier work, we examined the
finance and software industries; earlier papers [4, 3] present some of our preliminary
observations from those industries.
This paper presents work performed by author Sinclair as part of her doctoral
research. In the forthcoming dissertation from which it is excerpted, it will be proceeded
by a trio of chapters giving more detail on these previous studies. Section 2 and
Section 3 introduce this study. Section 4 provides some background observations.
Section 5 reports on user perceptions and experience. Section 6 reports on compliance
and circumvention. Section 7 discusses some access control problems that emerged in
a teaching hospital. Section 8 concludes.
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Context

After documenting and cataloguing problems reported by information security professionals in the Corporate Study, I wanted to continue this line of research in a way that
would allow me to better understand the users’ perspective. I was curious: were users
aware that some of their actions worked against the organization? Did they perceive
the cultural and technical factors I identified as impacting the organization’s identity
and access management efforts? Could I find a way to share their experience in a way
that would be useful to the technologists who design the systems that hold such sway
over their daily professional lives?
It was difficult to arrange interviews with end users of the financial and software
organizations we partnered with. This was in part a problem of logistics— identifying
users, getting approval from their managers, finding time on their calendars— but I believe also a product of our partners’ generally circumspect approach to collaboration.
An organization could be reasonably confident that its trained infosec professionals
would not reveal information that would embarrass the company, but the sorts of users
who were likely to share interesting anecdotes with us also had the potential to let slip
information that the organization might rather not get out. Although we had rigorous
confidentiality agreements that prevented us from revealing any uniquely identifying
information about participant organizations, I detected a degree of hesitancy in exposing us to information that they believed could be truly damaging to their reputations,
particularly on the part of the investment banks. (I conjecture that this hesitance was
due at least in part to worries about the risk of reputation damage incurred by, e.g.,
negative press.)
Happily, we were able to establish a relationship with an organization in the healthcare industry— specifically, a teaching hospital (details below)— that was willing to
let us interview end users directly. Perhaps this organization was more open than
corporate participants because it had greater confidence that its employees were doing
the right things, or perhaps its intimate experience with deriving value from empirical
research into human behavior helped it perceive that allowing us access could have
wide-reaching benefits. In any case, this study generated observations that both support and supplement those of the Corporate Study. In this document I touch on the
observations that overlap, but focus principally on the new insights.
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The Study

My approach to the Clinical Study had a much stronger ethnographic flavor than
the Corporate Study. This was in part because I had to engage emotionally with
participants in order to convince them to trust me while observing them; if I did not,
my presence made them visibly uncomfortable.
The results from this study are fewer than from the corporate study. This is in part
because the previous study involved a larger number of organizations, and because the
data gleaned from talking to IT professionals who deal extensively with access control
can provide a variety of insights more quickly than can be uncovered by direct observation of end users. However, I think that the access control solution used by partner
organizations is the largest determining factor: because the clinical partner puts comparatively few restrictions on users’ access to its systems, it faces fewer challenges in
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the technical management of access control policies.

3.1

Teaching Hospital

I will refer to the healthcare organization that partnered with us in this research as
Teaching Hospital; it is a tertiary care facility that has under 10,000 employees.
I conducted semi-structured interviews with a total of seven technical staff members (two of whom are also practicing physicians) and directly observed approximately
twenty clinicians in their working environments. My observations were limited to activities not at the point of care (i.e., when clinicians were not interacting directly with
patients), and focused on their use of computer systems. Of the twenty clinicians,
approximately four were physicians (including residents), one a nurse practitioner, two
medical students, and the remainder were nurses or other clinical workers. I was also
able to conduct semi-structured interviews lasting more than fifteen minutes with approximately five of the participants I observed. (I categorize shorter interviews as part
of observation.)

Participant recruitment My sampling methodology— the process I used to enlist participants— is sometimes described in social science research as “snowball sampling”: new subjects are suggested (and sometimes directly recruited) from among the
acquaintances of existing subjects. If I were to conduct further research at Teaching
Hospital, there are a small number of participants whom I could clearly identify as potential snowball “cores” for further sampling. As it was, my initial set of participants
were drawn from clinicians serving on an IT steering committee.

Data-gathering For about half of my interactions with clinical users I worked by
myself, and relied on my fieldnotes for data. For the other half of interactions I was
accompanied by a fellow graduate student or an undergraduate research assistant,
and used their fieldnotes for data in addition to my own. One observation (of an IT
professional conducting a compliance check on workstations spread throughout one
wing of the hospital) was conducted by an undergraduate intern working under my
supervision.

Software training I was also able to sit in on a three-hour training session that new
employees attend to become acquainted with Teaching Hospital’s electronic medical
record system, which I refer to hereafter as Teaching Hospital Electronic Record System
(THERS).

4

Background Observations

Structure Teaching Hospital is an academic medical center that includes a number
of specialty medical clinics as well as a multi-specialty physician group practice. IT
operations are overseen by a group of technical professionals and medical doctors. Each
department or clinic operates with a fair degree of autonomy, although IT operations
are centralized.
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The medical cottage industry Domain experts from other institutions and participants from Teaching Hospital have described healthcare as a “cottage industry” in
which each institution has its own distinct culture and practices. As one domain expert who had extensive experience digitizing another institution’s medical records said,
“Once you know one academic medical center... you know exactly one academic medical center.” The number of processes and practices that are so institution-specific
makes it hard to transfer personnel or knowledge from one organization to another;
this divide also makes it difficult for information security professionals to directly apply
lessons learned in one place to another.

Supremacy of patient care Above all, Teaching Hospital values the safety of its
patients and the quality of care it provides to them. This focus shapes many of the
decisions they make.

Data permanence As one participant noted, a clinical organization “can’t ever
throw information out.” Medical records, including electronic ones, are legal documents. If a clinician makes an error an amendment is added, but the error is preserved
as part of the record.

Technical topics
Below is a sample of technical topics that came up during interviews with infosec
professionals at Teaching Hospital.
1. Authentication systems, including passwords and biometrics
2. Deauthentication (making sure users log out when they are done with a computer)
3. Transferring patient data from old computer systems to new ones
4. Technical initiatives inspired by new regulatory requirements, including the encryption of all Teaching Hospital laptop hard drives
5. The role and challenges of new devices in the medical setting, including iPads
and smart medical machines
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Results: User Perception and Experience

Participants in the Clinical Study use computers every day as part of their jobs. Teaching Hospital has migrated the majority of its record-keeping to the computer; as its
central electronic medical record (EMR) system, THERS is used in some capacity by
every clinician in the organization. Individual departments within Teaching Hospital
also have specialty computer systems for handling inpatient data, obtaining medical
images, and other tasks that are outside the scope of THERS.
Even though participants make regular use of computers as part of their jobs, the
vast majority professed a degree of discomfort or perceived incompetence with the
machines: in first being introduced to me and my research, they would invariably say
something along the lines of “Oh, you shouldn’t talk to me, because I don’t know
anything about computers!” or “Don’t ask me, I can barely get them to do what I
want!” It was hard to sort out whether this reaction was actually a product of their
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experiences with the computer, a response to being introduced to me as “computer
security researcher,” or simply a reluctance to take time away from their already-full
professional schedules to talk to me. In any case, I often responded by saying the
equivalent of, “Oh, don’t worry, I don’t need to ask you any technical questions. I’m
trying to make computer systems more secure while also making them easier to use,
so I’m actually looking for people to tell me about what annoys them or makes it hard
to get work done.” Participants usually responded in turn with an enthusiastic or
humorous attitude, and comments to the effect of “Well, I can certainly do that!” or
“I’ve got enough to fill that whole notebook of yours!”
It is not surprising that most clinical participants seem less comfortable with computer systems than I do; after all, my work is focused on studying such systems, and
computers have been central to my life for much of my life— so my net experience is
greater than that of participants even ten or twenty years my senior. In observing their
discomfort, however, I do not seek to paint them as bumbling technophobes; in fact,
most expressed that they enjoyed using computers in their personal lives. I believe
that their discomfort with computers in the workplace is largely a product of fear : the
fear of doing “the wrong thing,” of irrevocably messing up a critical clinical system,
and— most immediately— the fear of taking an action that will make it hard for them
to keep up the frenetic pace their professional environment demands.
I believe that this low-level fear is important to understanding many user behaviors, and particularly relevant in studying users’ interaction with identity and access
management systems: after all, access control mechanisms regularly “challenge” users
by asking them to prove who they are, and when a user answers a challenge incorrectly,
she is locked out of everything she needs to get her job done.
The rest of this section explores some of my observations on about clinical participants’ beliefs and experiences, whereas Section 6 considers some of the participant
behaviors I observed surrounding identity and access management.

5.1

Relating to the machine

I observed one nurse manager in a small department for a period of about two hours:
she spent the whole time at her desk, either talking on the phone with patients, using
her computer, or doing both simultaneously. Although she did not employ keyboard
shortcuts, her actions in the programs she used frequently were as quick and confident
as those of any seasoned system administrator; it was clear that the volume of her
interaction had brought her a certain degree of mastery.
Despite this apparent confidence, she expressed a high level of anxiety about any
possible changes to the computer systems. In discussing updates to the interface of
THERS, she exclaimed,
“When anything—even the colors—is changed, it freaks you out!”
Now, this participant was not inherently opposed to changes in the system, especially if she understood how the change could make it easier to do her job.1 At the
1

When she lamented that her limited screen real estate made it difficult to use many programs at once
(i.e., when coordinating the schedules of multiple providers while also entering data into THERS) I mentioned
that many computer programmers use multiple screens at once. She jumped on the idea, and said that she
would love to experiment with such a setup, but that since her department was not a high priority in the
organization, she doubted she could convince the IT staff to go for it.
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same time, she depended heavily on being able to interact quickly with the it, and
dreaded the possibility that something would confuse her and slow her down.
While the nurse manager had a concrete understanding of the capabilities and
behavior of the computer systems, other participants’ beliefs seemed to have been
shaped by trial and error, and had the potential to cause significant unnecessary strife.
One nurse who worked with medical images had to reboot her computer after a crash,
and was frustrated because the other workstations in the area were already occupied.
Normally, she said, she would use a different computer that was already running so she
didn’t have to start up particular software program again. Although she had been using
this program since early that morning on the machine in question, she anticipated that
it would take a long time for the program to get going, because so many other people
in Teaching Hospital were using it. She explained that “the system” slowed down the
closer to noon you got, and if you tried to launch it after noon you were practically
guaranteed to be locked out. When I asked her how she knew this, she related that
this had been her exact experience when she was first using the program, but that
she had avoided having to log on any time after 10:00 since. She was surprised when
the program started up quickly, and I wondered how many times she had changed
workstations because she had taken one negative experience to be indicative of the
general case.
One participant— a doctor completing her residency— lamented the fact that she
could not use her personal Apple computer to log in to THERS. She reported that
residents are often responsible for entering notes into patient records, and felt that
home access to THERS would allow her to both more happily complete her work
in the evenings and prepare in the morning for the upcoming day’s work. Strong
personal preferences about computer systems are likely to become more common as
the next generation of medical professional enter their field. I wonder what impact
their experience (and increased comfort) with computers at an early age will have on
the role and expectations for clinical systems in the future.

5.2

The technology ecosystem

Participants frequently expressed frustration with aspects of computer systems that
were close to working, but that failed in small or irregular ways. For example, THERS
and department-specific systems were generally good about sharing data, but one program periodically failed to update THERS, particularly if a provider quit out of the
program without explicitly closing a patient’s record first. Practitioners waiting for
the data to appear in THERS could be stalled unnecessarily— and when they realized
the problem, said they could not blame anyone other than the computer system.
Participants described another frustrating feature in the mechanism by which external lab results were imported into THERS. While it was convenient to have faxes
scanned and uploaded to the appropriate patient record, all entries were labeled with a
date and the generic title “Lab Result.” When a practitioner wanted to see the results
of an external blood test taken the week before, she had to potentially choose from a
potentially long column of generic “Lab Result” entries in the patient’s record.
An obvious source of assistance for users experiencing problems with computer systems is the organization’s helpdesk. However, one participant reported significant frustration even in dealing with helpdesk staff: she said that she had a favorite helpdesker,
and that if anyone other than this favorite answered the phone, she would hang up
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immediately (only to try again a few minutes later). Given how much organizations
rely on helpdesk metrics to gauge whether users are successful in getting their jobs
done with the software systems, this behavior— whether due to the user’s computer
anxiety, her perception of the helpdesk staff’s general incompetence, or some other
factor— would seem to be particularly problematic.

5.3

Of and for the patients

In the course of this study I came to believe that medical practitioners define and
measure nearly every aspect of their profession in terms of their patients. In expressing
a frustration, participants often grounded their complaint in its impact on patient
care; in praising a new computer feature, they often explained how it made the lives
of their patients better. Even though they are not computer experts, their wealth of
experience dealing with patients provides them with a better understanding than any
computer professional of how computer systems impact clinical settings. In discussing
electronic medical records, one practitioner said that she was enthusiastic to see them
more widely adopted. She noted that while some people believed that using computers
in exam rooms would introduce distance between providers and patients, she found
that the computers gave her the ability to share information— particularly charts
and images— quickly, easily, and intuitively, which actually brought her closer to her
patients. Once she said it, this made perfect sense— but it was a point that had not
occurred to me all the times I’d heard the subject discussed.
Sometimes the overwhelming focus on patients added unusual constraints to participants’ patterns of computer usage. I observed the nurses in one department carefully
negotiating and planning which laptop to use as a new round of patients were scheduled
to arrive. When I asked why it was an issue— weren’t all the laptops the same?—
they said that only one laptop had a music program installed on it. At first I assumed
that they were listening to the music for their own amusement, and questioned their
priorities to myself. They then explained that there was one long and uncomfortable
diagnostic procedure that some of their patients had to go through, and that they liked
being able to offer music to help take their patients’ minds off the experience.

5.3.1

Patient access to data

As a computer scientist who takes an interest in the usability of security systems, I
thought I had a good basic grasp of the needs and motivations that drive users in any
environment. The insights that clinicians can offer about their computer usage— more
importantly, the insights that stem from their fundamental and primary mission of
patient care, which I did not understand but that they take for granted— surprised
me time and again.
At the same time, some participating physicians made assertions about their patients that I would like to see studied further. In particular, multiple physicians expressed concern about the notion of providing a patient with the access logs of her
medical record; these physicians, who were well versed in the structure of the computer system and the organization’s clinical, research, and billing processes, argued
that a patient would not understand that many hospital employees legitimately need
access to patient data in order for the patient to be seen, receive car, and have that
care paid for. A patient without this understanding, they argued, would be alarmed
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to see access logs containing so many unfamiliar names. (The patient might expect
to see the name of her doctor, but not of the billing clerk who sent paperwork to her
insurance company.) While I agree that this data by itself could be alarming to many
patients, I wonder whether it might be possible for a hospital to provide additional
context to help patients understand what they are reading.
The subject of patients’ understanding of access logs came up in a discussion of how
the organization handles cases where a patient is concerned that her record is being
improperly accessed, e.g., by an ex-spouse who happens to work at the hospital. The
current process for auditing access logs, which can be initiated by the institution or by
a patient if she has concerns, is conducted entirely in-house; at the end, the patient is
given a simple yes-or-no answer depending on whether the internal auditor determined
that inappropriate access had occurred. While this solution can be an effective way
to address patients’ concerns in such a situation, it is neither particularly transparent
(thus, some patients might wonder whether a hospital was hiding something to to save
face) nor scalable if the number of requesting patients grows large. Providing users
with the access logs of their records would, on the other hand, be transparent and
could scale better. If a patient suspects that an acquaintance is improperly accessing
her medical record, she is likely to be better qualified to perform an audit, simply
because she is the only one familiar with all of her acquaintances. In fact, this is the
exact process that employees of the organization can use to audit access to their own
medical record if they receive care from their employer. While I understand physicians’
desire to protect their patients from unnecessary confusion and concern, I worry that
this position could, without further data to support it, be viewed someday soon as
antiquated and somewhat paternalistic.

6

Results: Compliance and Circumvention

In comparison to participants in the Corporate Study, employees at Teaching Hospital
seemed hesitant in extolling the role of security technologies while discussing their
organizations. At the outset of the Clinical Study, one physician expressed skepticism
bordering on defensiveness; he said that clinicians in Teaching Hospital were
“... highly interested in security... but not when it prevents us from getting
our jobs done.”
Although participants believed information security was important, and something
the organization should strive for, their experience indicated that it was very hard to
make systems that were both usable and secure. One infosec professional stated, with
both frustration and chagrin, that
“Many of our clinicians work around [the security software, rather] than
with it.”
The culture of Teaching Hospital differed from that of the Corporate Study organizations. Bankers were quick to speak up when they had a problem with a computer
system, and often went so far as to blame the system and its administrators from reducing their productivity. As Section 5 notes, clinical participants often seemed afraid that
they would make a mistake with computer systems. Even when users in clinical organizations were confident in their understanding of the system, they seemed less likely to
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vocalize their dissatisfaction through official channels; these users were perhaps more
likely to vent their frustration in a way that resulted in unexpected confrontation or
escalation. More often than not, though, users quietly did what they needed to do to
get their jobs done.
During one observation I watched a clinician trying to log on to a system she rarely
used retrieve her password from a binder in a nearby cupboard. She saw me watching,
and told me that
“I know we’re not supposed to write them down, but if they want us to get
in...”
She recognized that what she was doing was against organization policy, but I got
the impression that if I hadn’t been there she wouldn’t have thought twice about it.

6.1

Underentitlement

Although participants from Teaching Hospital do not describe underentitlement using
the same terminology as participants in the Corporate Study, they recognize the problems it poses. Indeed, given that timely access to medical data can allow clinicians to
save lives, they consider avoiding underentitlement to be of paramount importance.
In describing their goals for future security systems, one infosec professional said
that they “want to increase control without losing flexibility.” The number of programmatic controls present in THERS was minimal in comparison to the systems discussed
by participants of the Corporate Study. This surprised me: I expected (perhaps because I have read so many access control papers that use medical examples to motivate
the need for the new access control models they describe) that access to an individual
patient’s records would at least be restricted to the set of clinicians working to provide
care to that patient. However, as discussed above, the number of hospital staff members who legitimately need access to medical data in the course of providing care is
large, and includes a significant number of non-clinicians. Participants reported that
these non-clinical users’ access was carefully restricted to a small subset of patient data
using a classic RBAC scheme. (Note that I did not have the opportunity to interview,
for example, an administrator tasked with billing insurance providers, so have no data
on whether these users experienced underentitlement or circumvented controls to get
their jobs done.)

6.1.1

Break-glass protection

Participants also reported that restricting clinicians’ access to patient data without
compromising patient care had proven to be unsolvable with the available tools. THERS
thus implemented break-glass controls, which guarantee clinicians’ ability to view patient data without intervention by a third party (e.g., an administrator). Break-glass
was implemented in the following cases:
1. For records containing sensitive information, such as HIV test results,
2. For records belonging to high-profile patients, such as celebrities,
3. For other records, determined by individual clinicians at their discretion.
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Records in THERS were visually marked when under the protection of a break-glass
control. Users2 who attempt to access a protected record encounter a dialog that 1)
Notifies them the record is under break-glass protection, 2) reminds them that their
access will be logged and responsible clinicians will be notified, and 3) Asks them to
confirm that they want to proceed with the access.

6.1.2

Control challenges

Participants of this study reported that their organization experienced challenges in
deploying more proactive controls for some of the same reasons reported in the Corporate Study. One basic criterion for controlling access to patient records— whether
a clinician has a care relationship with a patient— is challenged as in finance by the
tremendous churn that hospitals experience in staff assignments. Several classes of
users change departments as a normal course of their work, including medical students
rotating through departments as part of their training, and residents in specialties such
as anesthesia which require them to roam from one inpatient department to another
while on call. Even outside of teaching hospitals, “floating” nurses can change assignments daily, physicians are frequently asked to consult or provide a second opinion on
one others’ cases, and all clinicians establish temporary care relationships with patients
in a colleague’s absence.
Participants identified additional properties of the healthcare environment that
would challenge an effort to control access to subsections of a patient’s medical record.
Whereas a database—a resource commonly under access control in the financial industry—
is organized according to a well-understood schema, clinical data is often highly unstructured.3 More significantly, it is difficult to know ahead of time whether particular
information from the patient’s record is going to be relevant in future situations. We
might not expect that the notes from Jane’s podiatrist five years ago will help her
neurologist diagnose her condition today, but participants report that the availability
of any piece of data may be critical important in providing effective care.

6.2

Deauthentication and styrofoam cups

While the infosec team of Teaching Hospital largely perceived themselves successful in
providing usable and secure authentication, they had identified the problem of deauthentication: how do you make sure people log out of a computer system when they are
done using it? Here as in the high-stress financial environment that was the subject of
the Corporate Study, the standard approach of applying inactivity timeouts was met
with strong user opposition. For every timeout value the infosec team tried, it seemed
like there were departments for whom the value was too short (users complained that
2

I unfortunately did not discuss further details on the break-glass feature during interviews with participants, and thus do not know answers to several questions that one might ask about its implementation. For
example, if a user chooses to access a protected record, will she be prompted to break the glass upon future
access attempts? When a clinician adds break-glass protection as in case 3, can he provide a whitelist of
users who should not be prompted to break the glass? Aside from the physician who imposes protection in
case 3, who is notified when the glass is broken, and can that list be specified or changed?
3
Participants reported that the large amount of unstructured data is a significant barrier in reaping the
benefits expected from electronic medical records, but that clinicians in the past had ignored or actively
fought efforts to impose increased structure on their data-collection process.
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they were logged out while still using the system) and others for which the same timeout value was too long (compliance checks in revealed logged-in computers that were
left unattended).
At the same time, the nature of the healthcare setting left workstations exposed
to large numbers of people not employed by the organization— and made it harder
for employees to clearly identify strangers in their work environment. (The number
of people regularly seen on an individual floor of a financial institution is easily both
smaller and more stable than the crowds of patients and clinicians coursing through a
hospital department in any given day.) Although financial organizations have stricter
timeout policies, reliable de-authentication would thus seem to be more important in
healthcare, where it can be harder to spot an opportunistic outsider.

6.2.1

Proximity sensors

In an effort to solve the deauthentication problem, the infosec team of Teaching Hospital deployed to a set of its workstations a special sensor designed to detect the close
proximity of a human. Thus, when a user walked away the proximity sensor could
detect her departure and sign her out if necessary. Like timeouts, this approach was
met with widespread user complaints4 ; many said the sensors logged them out while
they were still standing there, or were confused by people walking down the hall. Eventually some clever user realized that the sensors had no minimum detection distance,
and thwarted one by putting a styrofoam cup over it. The solution spread throughout
the organization, and shortly thereafter the infosec team removed the devices.5

6.2.2

On closing tickets

Both clinical and IT participants reported that the infosec team encouraged users to
deauthenticate by closing their active Kerberos ticket6 Because the organization used
Kerberos to mediate access to all its sensitive resources (electronic medical records,
email, and department-specific systems), closing the ticket should, theoretically, be the
best way to de-authenticate quickly. However, as one savvy clinical user pointed out
(and others confirmed later), users who comply with this exact guidance can actually
experience more frustration than users who de-authenticate from each individual application (i.e., using a Logout menu or button). As the observant clinical participant
demonstrated to me, if user u terminates her session in THERS by some mechanism
other than that application’s native logout flow, user n + 1 must wait while THERS
restarts— a process that can take multiple minutes— before she can log in. Thus, at
least in some departments, users exerted negative social pressure on their peers who
followed the IT department’s deauthentication advice. I don’t know how much this
pressure impacted users’ deauthentication habits— are there some who gave up trying to authenticate in exasperation?— but I did observe cases of users who viewed
4

Participants practically shuddered remembering the feedback they received during this experiment. It
seems that users were vitriolic and quite aggressive in expressing their discontent— to the point that at least
one device was literally ripped off of the workstation to which it was attached.
5
At least, the ones that angry users had not already broken.
6
Kerberos tickets manifested on the workstation’s screen as a small window containing the authenticated
user’s name. Some users chose to minimize it, as it stayed in the foreground and they found it got in the
way. It could be closed like any other window with a standard mouse click to the appropriate corner.
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this mismatch between official advice and practical realities as evidence that the IT
department didn’t really know what it was talking about.

6.3

Compliance checks

Following the removal of the proximity sensors described above, the hospital staff
decided to pursue a solution to the deauthentication problem that was not rooted in
technology, but based instead on user education and periodic compliance audits. An
intern who collaborated with me in this research joined a member of the hospital’s
infosec staff in performing one such compliance audit; over a period of a few hours
they checked roughly 225 workstations to identify ones that had been left unattended
while still possessing a valid Kerberos ticket.
The compliance check was conducted as follows:
1. The staff member had a list of physical regions of the hospital he was going to
target and a time period in which he was going to conduct the check. This allowed
him to achieve systematic coverage in his audits over time.
2. The staff member walked around the designated region of the hospital. For each
computer, he marked down its state:
(a) in use by an employee
(b) unattended without a ticket open
(c) unattended and with a ticket open
3. For each machine that has been left unattended with an open ticket, he performed
the following steps:
(a) Sent an email to the user from their own email account with a standardized
message informing them of the situation and offering guidance for the future.
(b) Logged the user off (closed the Kerberos ticket).
(c) Used the workstation’s web browser to open to an internal webpage that
explained why the unattended ticket was closed.
(d) Placed a pen light printed with the message “Log off before you walk off /
Thank you for protecting patient information” at the workstation.
The auditor’s definition of “in use” seemed a bit loose, in that machines with open
tickets were considered to as such if there were clinicians in the same hallway—even if
those clinicians were not directly interacting with machines. This situation represents
one core of the organization’s de-authentication issue: throughout my observations, it
became clear that clinicians frequently alternate between interacting with a stationary
computer and performing non-computer tasks. A clinician believes that she is still
using the computer while performing other tasks, because she intends to come back to
it within a matter of minutes. Similarly, the frequency with which she must alternate
between computer and non-computer tasks is precisely what drives her to consider
logging out and then logging back in again to be so burdensome.
Given this context, it is not surprising that the IT staff member chose to apply a
somewhat broad categorization of “in use”: indeed, I think that his choice reflects an
understanding of users existing perceptions of that term. Moreover, a more strict interpretation of the de-authentication policy would be viewed by users as being antithetical
to their goal of providing efficient patient care.
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The intern who observed the compliance check noted the infosec staffer seemed
highly conscious of clinicians’ perceptions and opinions in general, to the point that
the intern noted him to be “on a bit of a PR mission”. The use of pen-light giveaways7
is consistent with this attention to user perception, and indicates a recognition that
improving user de-authentication habits is difficult if one simultaneously inspires hatred
for the IT department.

6.4

Compliance budgets

The compliance behavior that is documented here supports Beautement et al.’s theory
of compliance budgets[1]. As those authors observed of their study participants, the
users of Teaching Hospital “value security, both for themselves and for the organization they work for.” At the same time, participants chose whether to comply with
deauthentication policies based on the costs and benefits they perceived as being associated with that compliance— and we can tell from their behavior that they perceived
differences in interacting with break-glass controls, reacting to timeouts vs. manual
compliance checks, and using proximity sensors (which quickly maxed out their compliance budgets and inspired physical expressions of their frustration). Like Beautement’s
participants, hospital users expressed that “their primary work task dominates their
perspective whereas the security goals of the organization are subordinate”: at a high
level, the primacy of patient care dictates that underentitlement is unacceptable, even
if the only workable solution results in probable overentitlement.

7 Results: The Phalanx Problem (Or: Bands
of Roving Doctors)
In discussing access control—particularly authentication—with participants from Teaching Hospital, they brought up a number of usage scenarios that seemed to push the
bounds of what current technology can cope with. As described above, they struggled
with user deauthentication: neither inactivity timeouts nor the proximity sensors they
deployed seemed to be good solutions; biometrics were appealing, but fingerprints were
thwarted by medical gloves, facial recognition by surgical masks, voice recognition by
noisy clinics, and the iris scans by the high equipment cost. The possibility of using
RFID tags to solve deauthentication also came up, but there they raised the question:
if you have a group of doctors within several feet of a computer when an authentication
request is made, how could a system identify which doctor to authenticate?
While one can imagine technical solutions that address this particular conundrum,
the question inspired a discussion about patient rounds, which in a teaching hospital
can involve a whole team of doctors, residents, medical students, nurses, and other
clinicians moving throughout an inpatient ward. During rounds the team makes its way
from patient to patient, discussing each case, taking notes on the patient’s condition,
quizzing clinicians-in-training, and generally providing care.
However, the dominant paradigm of human-computer interaction has long been
focused on a single user: if there was a single computer being used during rounds to
7

The staffer reported that they used to give out stress balls, but that “people threw them at” him in
their frustration.
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interact with the patient’s electronic medical record, which individual should be the
one who authenticates to the EMR? Moreover, why should the system be limited to
authenticating and logging the actions of a single user when it is in fact a group of
clinicians who are actively participating? In these situations it is usually a resident who
records the notes and orders, yet it is the attending physician who is legally responsible
for the group’s decisions and the subsequent care the patient receives.
Furthermore, the required system behavior here goes beyond simply determining
the current group physically present, and operating on the privileges of the union of the
group or the most dominant member of the group. For example, suppose attending
physician Alice is authorized to act on patient Peter. If resident Roberta stands at
Alice’s side during rounds that visit Peter, then Roberta inherits the right to follow-up
with Peter later on. Proximity now can give individual rights later.
As noted above, Teaching Hospital relied on break-glass controls to restrict clinicians’ access to sensitive data. A solution for this challenge of authenticating groups
of clinicians— which we have taken to calling the Phalanx Problem8 — could provide
a more advanced authorization system with valuable data about which clinicians have
been participating in a particular patient’s care. Indeed, without a mechanism for
automatically gathering such data, it would seem impossible to support more finelygrained controls on clinicians’ access to patient data without incurring tremendous
administrative costs.
I believe that more time should be spent studying the data-access and data-generation
patterns exhibited by clinicians conducting rounds, as well as other dynamic groups of
professionals whose actions transcend the current one-user, one-machine authentication
paradigm. Our subsequent reports will go into a more detailed exploration of potential
future work (including a discussion of potential technical challenges and contributions)
in this vein.

8

Conclusion

This study lends additional weight to many of the results of the Corporate Study, and
offers further insights into the human factors that impact the success of access control
systems. The users of Teaching Hospital possessed a diversity of skill levels, depths of
understanding, and degrees of comfort with computer systems, but discussions with a
small set painted a coherent picture of the limitations of current access control technologies and policies in their environment. Although I believe these results support
the hypothesis that human factors are at the root of why access control systems fail,
I believe they also indicate that human users cannot be blamed for this failure. The
users I interviewed and observed At Teaching Hospital have the best interests of their
patients and their organization at heart, and work consistently to comply with infosec
policies while meeting the constraints of their professional environments. The failure of
access control lies instead with us, the researchers and technologists who design access
control systems and policies that fail to take into account the basic realities of human
workflows. It is thus that I propose that we fundamentally reboot our understanding
of the access control problem.
8

A phalanx was an ancient greek military formation; the phalanges are the collection of bones that
collectively form the fingers of a hand.
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